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Recent empirical work has found that firms 
do more innovation when they are exposed to 
more low-cost import competition (Bloom, 
Draca, and Van Reenen 2012). Why is it that 
they innovate after something bad has happened 
to them? To explain this we add a natural fric-
tion to a model of growth and trade, an adjust-
ment cost to reallocating factors of production 
between firms. These frictions can “trap” fac-
tors of production inside a firm that suffers from 
unexpected import competition. This reduces 
the opportunity cost of the inputs that the firm 
uses to innovate. Because the social return to 
innovation is higher than the private return, trade 
liberalization can generate extra welfare benefits 
when this friction is present. Our finding that 
frictions can increase the welfare gains from a 
trade liberalization stands in contrast to the stan-
dard view that models which include such fric-
tions reduce the gains from trade (e.g., Autor, 
Dorn, and Hanson 2013).
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I. Empirical Motivation
Business case studies have long suggested that 
bad news in the form of increased import com-
petition from low-cost countries can cause firms 
to “innovate or die.” For example, Freeman and 
Kleiner (2005) describe how a US shoe maker 
responded to rising Chinese imports by halting 
production of mass-market men’s shoes that 
were no longer profitable. Rather than simply 
idle its factory, skilled employees, brand capital, 
and organizational resources, the firm introduced 
new types of shoes for smaller niche markets. 
One specially designed batch of boots, run off for 
a local construction firm, had metal hoops in the 
soles that made it easier for workers to rapidly 
climb ladders. Making these boots took skilled 
engineers and R&D. The new design earned a 
patent. Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007) 
report a similar story from US valve manufactur-
ers. After losing the market for low-cost valves to 
Chinese competitors they switched to inventing 
and producing smaller runs of innovative valves.
The behavior reported in these case stud-
ies has also been confirmed in an econometric 
analysis on large panel data samples of firms in 
12 European countries by Bloom, Draca, and Van 
Reenen (2012). Firms that experienced a large 
increase in import competition after China’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization rap-
idly increased their R&D expenditure, patenting 
and adoption of information technology (see 
Figure 1). These changes were not merely the 
result of reallocation toward more innovative 
firms. Individual firms that faced more import 
competition exhibited a bigger increase in inno-
vation. Nor did the results simply reflect the 
pro-innovation “escape competition” effects that 
arise in quality ladder models (e.g., Aghion et al. 
2005) as increased competition from  high-cost 
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OECD countries (like Japan) did not lead to a 
similar increase in innovation.
The first challenge that these results pose is to 
explain the difference in the behavior of an indi-
vidual firm before and after a trade shock. Why 
is it that they innovate after something bad has 
happened to them? The usual presumption is that 
a negative shock will reduce investment, because 
it signals either lower expected returns or higher 
expected costs from more reliance on exter-
nal finance. The second challenge is to explain 
the cross-sectional difference in the behavior 
between firms after the shock hits. The move to a 
more open trade regime could raise the return to 
innovation, as models of trade and growth sug-
gest. In this case, the incentive to innovate should 
be higher for all firms. Once again, the usual pre-
sumption would be that the firms that face a sig-
nificant loss in revenue would be no more likely, 
and perhaps much less likely, to take advantage 
of the new opportunities. Why then do the results 
show just the opposite, that it is the firms that 
face more competition from imports that under-
take relatively more innovation? The final chal-
lenge is why does this increase in innovation 
arise in response to low-cost export competition 
from China but not from high-cost export com-
petition from countries like Japan?
The dynamic general equilibrium model 
fully developed with details available in Bloom 
et al. (2012) shows that adversity can indeed 
increase the rate of innovation if factors of 
 production are trapped inside a firm. For the 
shoe company mentioned above, its workers 
might be trapped because they have human capi-
tal that is specific to the firm and which will be 
lost if they move to other firms. The firm’s phys-
ical capital might also be costly to uproot and 
sell. After the trade shock reduces the price for 
one of the goods that the firm had been produc-
ing, the opportunity cost goes down for inputs 
that are trapped within the firm. The firm does 
more innovation, not because of an increase in 
the value of a newly designed good, but rather 
because of a fall in the opportunity cost of the 
inputs used to design and produce new goods.
II. A Model of Growth and Trade
Our model of growth extends the lab-equip-
ment model of growth and trade proposed in 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), which builds on 
the closed-economy model in Romer (1987). We 
assume a West-East model of the product cycle 
in which all innovation takes place in the West. (The West-East axis now seems a better way to 
capture trade flows between high- and low-wage 
countries than the traditional North-South axis.) 
Our extension allows not just for the extremes 
of autarky and free trade, but also for a contin-
uum of intermediate degrees of trade integration 
indexed by a parameter ϕ, which measures the 
fraction of goods that are allowed to trade freely. 
Consistent with previous results on growth and 
trade, an increase in trade integration (ϕ) raises 
the returns to innovation and increases the rate 
of growth of patents and the rate of growth of 
output, which benefits both regions.
Let g(ϕ) denote the steady-state growth rate 
associated with a given level of trade integration. 
We calibrate the model to the US experience in 
the last few decades and find that the increase 
in the growth rate associated with a change in ϕ is moderate. Increased trade with developing 
countries such as China could boost the world-
wide steady-state growth rate by about 0.1 per-
centage points, so g( ϕ′ ) − g(ϕ) ≈ 0.1 percent. 
In our baseline this means that growth rises from 
2.0 to 2.1 percentage points per annum.
For convenience, we work with an endog-
enous growth model in which a change in policy 
leads to this kind of change in the steady-state 
growth rate. We might instead have used a 
semi-endogenous model of the type proposed 
Figure 1. IT Intensity Grows with Exposure to  
Chinese Imports
Note:  IT intensity defined as computers per employee, 
Chinese import growth defined as the change in China’s share 
of all European imports. 1 =  lowest quintile; 5 = highest 
quintile.
Source: Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2012). Data from 
23,000 firms across 12 European countries from 2000 to 
2007. 
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by Jones (1995b) in which policy changes 
induce long transitory changes in growth rates 
without changing the underlying steady-state 
growth rate. As Jones argues (1995a), this type 
of model provides a better fit to data over time 
horizons long enough to imply large changes 
in the stock of human capital, but there is little 
harm in assuming that the worldwide stock of 
human capital remains constant in the few years 
following a trade liberalization. Moreover, by 
making a small change in a single parameter, we 
could convert our model into a semi-endogenous 
model. By continuity, this small change would 
have little effect on our qualitative conclusions 
or numerical calculations.
To further limit the importance of any transi-
tion dynamics, we also minimize the persistence 
in the model. In particular, we assume that dura-
ble inputs in production last for only one period 
and that patents also last for only one period. With 
these assumptions, it takes only a few  periods to 
converge to a new, slightly higher steady-state 
growth rate after an unexpected change in ϕ.
III. Trapped Factors
To capture the cross-sectional result from 
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2012), that 
firms faced with competition from a low-
wage competitor do more innovation, we add 
adjustment costs that trap factors inside firms. 
Specifically, we assume that after a firm has 
acquired the factors that it will use in the current 
period, the government announces an increase 
from ϕ to  ϕ′ that allows more imports from the 
low-cost East. We also assume that these imports 
compete with goods produced only by a subset 
of firms, so some firms experience more trade 
competition, while others do not. Let  g  S (S for 
“Shock”) denote the rate of growth of patents at 
firms that face this trade shock and let  g  N (N for 
“No shock”) denote the growth rate of patents 
at firms that face no new competition for goods 
that they make. When the shock from ϕ to  ϕ′ is 
announced for period T, we find that
   g T S ( ϕ′ ) >  g T N( ϕ′ ) > g(ϕ).
Moreover, the difference between the two types 
of firms is large. In our baseline model, the num-
ber of new patents developed by a representative 
S firm that faces a shock jumps up to a level that 
is 11.9 percent higher than for an N firm with no 
shock. This cross-sectional impact on patenting 
rates can be seen in Figure 2, which plots for each 
industry the flow of new patents in the trapped-
factors environment. For convenience, we nor-
malize the preshock patent flows to 1,000 patents 
for each type of firm. The figure also shows the 
identical rate of growth of patents for the two 
types of firms when factors are fully mobile.
To indicate the effect that the trapped factors 
and trade shock have on the aggregate rate of 
growth in the impact period which we denote by 
T (period 2 in the simulation in Figure 2), let 
 g T Trapped be the aggregate rate of growth of patents 
when factors are trapped and the trade shock is 
unanticipated. Let  g T Mobile denote the correspond-
ing rate of growth when all factors are fully 
mobile. We find that
   g T Trapped >  g T Mobile .
In our calibrated baseline, we observe a 
one-period growth boost ( g T Trapped −  g T Mobile ≈ 
0.1  percent). This means that in period T the 
growth rate is 2.2 percent per year, slightly 
higher than the new steady-state growth rate of 
2.1 percent per year. In subsequent periods, the 
factors are no longer trapped, so the growth rate 
returns quickly to the new steady-state value.
This one-period trapped-factors boost in 
the growth rate of patents causes a permanent 
increase in the stock of patents. Because the 
Figure 2. Industry Patent Flows Increase with  
Import Exposure
Notes: A trade shock occurs in period 1. All results in this 
figure are produced using code available at http://www.stan-
ford.edu/~nbloom/BRTV.zip.
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decentralized rate of innovation in such models 
is typically below the social optimum, the tem-
porary boost in the growth rate and the perma-
nent increase in the range of intermediate inputs 
induced by the interaction of trapped factors and 
the trade shock causes a correspondingly modest 
but positive increase in welfare in both the West 
and the East.
This type of welfare analysis of an unex-
pected, one-time policy change must, of course, 
be interpreted carefully. For example, if a partial 
trade liberalization today increases the expected 
probability of another liberalization in the future, 
firms would tend to reduce the inputs that they 
acquire to avoid the likelihood that they will 
face the private cost of being stuck with trapped 
factors when the next liberalization takes place. 
This would reduce the growth rate and thereby 
reduce welfare. For the same reason, if no fric-
tions were present, it does not follow that a gov-
ernment could raise welfare by imposing costs 
that trap factors in firms. Any attempt at trap-
ping factors inside firms at some future date will 
induce an offsetting reduction in factor demands 
by firms.
IV. Magnitudes of Trapped-Factor Approaches
The magnitudes of the growth and welfare 
effects identified here are also sensitive to a 
crucial parameter in the model. For a calibrated 
version of a model like this to fit actual data, 
there must be some short-run decreasing returns 
in the technology that converts inputs into new 
patents. Increasing the quantities of inputs that 
are devoted to innovation in a period by some 
factor λ should not lead to an increase in the 
number of patents by the same factor. Following 
Jones and Williams (2000), we assume that pat-
ents increase instead by the factor  λ 1/2 . A simple 
way to understand the source of these diminish-
ing returns is to think of innovation as a search 
process. If a larger team is engaged in search, 
the difficulties of coordinating the search effort 
mean that there is a higher probability that dif-
ferent groups make redundant discoveries. With 
two independent discoveries of something like a 
long-lasting light bulb, the number of new goods 
goes up by only one.
The key issue here is whether the challenge 
of avoiding redundant discoveries is entirely 
internal to a firm or extends across firms. It will 
be largely internal if different firms naturally 
 specialize in separate parts of search space. It 
will be at least partly external to an individual 
firm if firms tend to search in the same parts of 
the search space. Patent race models typically 
assume the extreme case of costs that are entirely 
external, in which case the production function 
for new designs exhibits a form of Marshallian 
external diminishing returns.
To capture the entire range of possibilities, 
the model allows for a parameter η that indexes 
the continuum of possibilities ranging from fully 
internal to fully external costs. The baseline 
specification described above has η = 1, which 
implies that the costs are fully internal. In an 
alternative specification that allows for external 
costs, the magnitude of the trapped-factors boost 
to growth should be smaller because the higher 
research costs (or equivalently the lower pro-
ductivity of research) caused by more innova-
tion at the shocked firms leads to an increase in 
the innovation cost at the no-shock firms, hence 
a reduction in the innovation they undertake. 
For example, in a specification that allows for η = 0.5, hence a 50–50 split between internal 
and external costs, we find that the magnitude of 
the difference  g T Trapped −  g T Mobile is about half as 
large as in our baseline.
The analysis of technology spillovers pro-
vided by Bloom, Schankerman, and Van Reenen (forthcoming) cannot reject the hypothesis that 
the costs of innovation are fully internal, so we 
use the value η = 1 in our benchmark model. It 
is important, nevertheless, to recognize that the 
implications of the model are sensitive to this 
parameter and that we do not have a precise esti-
mate of its value.
We conclude that the model suggests the 
combination of trapped factors and asymmetric 
trade shocks causes a modest boost to welfare 
and growth, but quantifying this effect with pre-
cision requires more work.
V. Micro Evidence and Macro Effects
We close with a discussion of what one could 
infer about aggregate effects from a micro-
economic analysis like the one undertaken by 
Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2012). As 
applied to data generated by our model, their 
approach would involve running a regression of 
the log of the number of new patents developed 
by the two types of firms on year  dummies that 
pick up the trends and a shocked-firm dummy 
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that picks up the difference between the S (shocked) and N (nonshocked) firms. Using 
data from the model, this regression would show 
a higher rate of patenting for the S firms in the 
impact period, T.
With large numbers of firms and no other 
macro shocks, this difference could be precisely 
estimated. The year dummies could also be used 
to estimate the aggregate impact—they would 
have magnitudes that grow at the rate g(ϕ) before 
the shock,  g T N( ϕ′ ) during the impact period, and 
g( ϕ′ ) after the shock. However, other factors (such as business-cycle fluctuations) can cause 
year-to-year changes in the rate of innovation, 
so the year effects from the micro analysis are 
unlikely to yield reliable direct evidence about 
the aggregate effect on growth of the increased 
trade with China.
Nevertheless, the micro evidence on the 
cross-sectional differences  g T S −  g T N does pro-
vide important guidance about the structure of 
the general equilibrium model that describes 
the economy, and this model can then be used 
to infer what the aggregate growth effect might 
be. In this sense, our conclusion is more positive 
about the value of micro evidence in predicting 
aggregate behavior than the conclusions reached, 
for example, by Arkolakis et al. (2008), Atkeson 
and Burstein (2010) and Arkolakis, Costinot, and 
Rodríguez-Clare (2012).
VI. Conclusions
We build a standard model of endogenous 
growth and trade, providing a tight link between 
trade liberalizations and increases in the long-
run growth rate. Motivated by empirical evi-
dence which suggests that increased low-cost 
import competition stimulated innovation at 
affected firms, we incorporate trapped factors 
which prevent movement of inputs across firms 
in the short-run. Reductions in the opportu-
nity cost of fixed inputs at shocked firms in the 
period of a trade liberalization yield an increase 
in innovative activity at those firms using these 
inputs. The presence of trapped factors leads to 
a permanent increase in the level of patents or 
varieties in the economy, as well as output and 
consumption, relative to an economy without 
adjustment costs, as well as an increase in wel-
fare, suggesting that models ignoring trapped 
factors underestimate the gains from trade 
liberalization.
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